

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY

March 10, 1971

Dear Andy:

I would very much appreciate receiving your personal views on the enclosed review of NATO strategy and forces.

As you know, the Defense Program Review Committee, consisting of senior representatives of all interested agencies, undertook a comprehensive review of U.S. strategy and forces for NATO at the same time that NATO itself was working on the AD-70 review. We completed this interagency review last year and it served as the intellectual basis for the November 19 NSC meeting on U.S. force levels in which you participated. Since then, we have initiated a series of follow-on studies designed to develop concrete plans for implementing the President's desire to enhance NATO's conventional capabilities, particularly for the initial period of a conflict when NATO weakness could lead to escalation.

Even though we have arrived at a sensible policy on NATO strategy and U.S. force levels, we still face the long-term problem of persuading our allies that the continuing improvement of NATO's general purpose forces is in their own best interest as well as ours and that efforts along these lines, if undertaken, will provide NATO with a strong conventional option. As a first step in this direction, I have had the Defense Program Review Committee Working Group "sanitize" our earlier work so that it might, if appropriate, be distributed to our allies through the NATO Defense Planning Committee in the near future. The enclosed paper represents the result of their effort and has been fully coordinated here in Washington.

OSD Review  
Completed

ON-FILE NSC RELEASE  
INSTRUCTIONS APPLY


TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY

2

I would greatly appreciate it if you could look this paper over and provide your views to me and the President on a personal basis. Your comments would be particularly valuable if they were available in the next week or so.

Warm regards,

  
Henry A. Kissinger

General Andrew Goodpaster  
Allied Commander of  
American Forces in Europe  
Brussels, Belgium

TOP SECRET/EYES ONLY

## INTRODUCTION

Concurrently with NATO's study of Alliance Defence for the Seventies, the United States carried out its own review of NATO strategy and forces and of U.S. forces in support of its North Atlantic Treaty commitments. Both the Alliance in the AD-70 report and the U.S. through its review came to identical conclusions: the decade of the Seventies does not yet promise the necessary conditions to permit the Alliance to reduce its defense posture. Quite the contrary, the implicit threats and uncertainties that confront NATO require that the Alliance move to correct those deficiencies in the common defense highlighted by the recommendations of the AD-70 report.

In announcing to the December NATO Ministerial meeting that, given a similar approach by its Allies, the United States would maintain and improve its own forces in Europe and not reduce them except in the context of mutual force reductions, the U.S. recognized that NATO's efforts to achieve an improved Alliance defense posture had only begun. As the Alliance begins to translate into action the AD-70 recommendations, the United States Government thought it might be useful to present some of the considerations developed in the course of the U.S. review, and on the basis of which the President made his decision. These considerations also led to a selection of critical deficiencies in Alliance defense posture, which the U.S. then recommended for inclusion in the AD-70 report.

Two sections of the U.S. study, one dealing with the military threat and the other dealing with the balance of conventional forces between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, are attached. In examining these sections, several points should be kept in mind:

- Since this was an internal U.S. study, it focused primary attention on those areas where the bulk of U.S. military forces are stationed in peacetime: the Center Region and the Mediterranean.
- It will be noted that conflicting sets of assumptions were examined in the various portions of the analysis of the conventional balance. These reflected some of the uncertainties in the situation and in the analysis, of which it was necessary to inform the President.
- Concerning the possible participation of French forces in case of war, it was arbitrarily assumed for analytical purposes that French forces would join the other Alliance forces by M+15.

This analysis is submitted as a working paper to the Executive Working Group of the Defence Planning Committee, and might be considered useful background to the ongoing consideration of measures to be taken to improve NATO's common defense.

*Complete document consists  
of 41 pages*